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Abstract 
 
 This article examines the ways people peacefully resisted government repression in recent 
decades in three sub-Saharan Africa countries. It is based on both archival research and 
more than 150 interviews by the author with key activists and others in the countries at 
various times from 2002-2012. This qualitative study makes several contributions to the 
literature. First, by including individual activism as well as organizational activism, it 
reveals wider and more varied participation in human rights activism than is normally 
detected. Second, where the usual focus in resistance studies is on mass movements, this 
study presents a more complex mosaic of resistance efforts that at times involved a mass 
campaign but at other times involved small ones as well as individual acts of resistance. 
Third, building on previous studies, it helps fill a gap in the more static social movement 
literature by explaining how resistance movements actually start. Fourth, it documents 
how human rights activists often proceeded without the kind of political openings or 
external opportunities and material resources usually emphasized in social movement 
studies. 
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Introduction 
Non-violent resistance against repressive regimes in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Liberia for 
human rights and democracy involved an array of both individual and organizational 
activists. Lawyers challenged the legality of the regimes, often working alone, without 
the support of their bar organization; journalists whose publication sometimes consisted 
of only a handful of people, defied government threats and continued exposing official 
abuse of power. Mothers, students, clerics and others, sometimes in small groups, 
sometimes in large ones, risked their safety to voice their demands for human rights and 
democracy.  
With some exceptions, their resistance was non-violent, a method which has proven more 
successful than violent resistance in achieving democratic government. 1 The violence mostly 
came from the regimes and included detention, torture, and killings. This study looks at 
resistance in Sierra Leone starting in 1976 and in Kenya and Liberia starting in the 1980s. All 
three countries had a change to democratic governments in the early 2,000s.  The study does not 
argue that the non-violent resistance caused the regime changes; but the resistance helped lay the 
groundwork for the changes. In Liberia, for example, an elected President who became 
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repressive only stepped down in the face of approaching rebels and an international indictment. 
But by then a range of civil society actors had repeatedly challenged the government’s 
legitimacy. In Sierra Leone, popular resistance helped force one military regime to step down; 
then widespread civil non-cooperation with a second military regime helped delegitimize it, 
paving the way for international military intervention that restored an elected, democratic 
government. In Kenya, without the domestic non-violent resistance in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, before major donor pressure was applied (somewhat sporadically), the change to multi-
party elections and eventual defeat of the ruling party in 2002 likely would not have occurred 
when it did.  
The study is based primarily on interviews over a ten-year period with many of 
the key human rights activists in the three countries, plus relevant archival materials. 
Interviewees were selected by a method known as ‘snowballing.’ Starting with better 
known activists (according to news accounts) and asking them and other informed 
observers for additional contacts, the author conducted semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews lasting anywhere from 30 minutes to (more typically) one or two hours or 
more.2 When male activists neglected to mention female activists, the author sought them 
out anyway. Most of the interviews were taped with the permission of the interviewees.  
This is not a variable analysis showing cause. It is a qualitative study of the 
peaceful resistance to authoritarian rule in the three sub-Saharan African countries. The 
study uses “sequential case selection,” as methodologist Charles Ragin of the University 
of Arizona describes. “The key is that in much qualitative work, case selection is often 
sequential, based on what has been learned so far. The goal is to solve puzzles through 
careful (sequential) case selection” (Ragin 2004, p. 129), looking for similar cases to see 
6 
 
if what happened in one country may have happened in others. The project began with 
the study of resistance in Kenya. Then I looked for countries which, according to human 
rights reports, had even more repression to see if similar resistance had taken place under 
such conditions.3 Sierra Leone and Liberia both had experienced civil wars as well as 
severe domestic repression. Both were accessible and had only recently emerged from 
authoritarian rule. This meant I could have the possibility of tracking down key 
participants in any peaceful resistance. But it wasn’t until I was on the ground doing 
research in these later two countries that I began to detect the scope of the non-violent 
resistance that had taken place.   
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
This study uses social movement theories to help examine how peaceful resistance movements 
for human rights and democratic freedoms in the three sub-Sahara African countries were 
organized and how activists attempted to win regime change.4  In his study of protest politics in 
the United States, David S. Meyer uses this definition  of a social movement: “…collective and 
sustained efforts that challenge existing or potential laws, policies, norms, or authorities, making 
use of extra-institutional as well as institutional political tactics” (Meyer 2007: 10). Goodwin and 
Jasper use a similar definition but add that the “collective, organized, sustained” challenges may 
also target “cultural beliefs and practices” (2003: 3). Tilly, similarly, emphasized a “sustained, 
organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” (Tilly 2004, p 3).  
Foweraker (1995: 23) sees social movements as a “process.” This study defines a social 
movement or resistance movement as a process of public challenges to a regime’s abuse of 
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power that may involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times mass public 
support, and is aimed at either regime reform or regime change. 
 This broader definition includes resistance that is not ‘sustained,’ a term that lacks 
precision anyway. In a country with a repressive government, resistance may be interrupted; and 
it may be cyclical in nature in response to either repression or intransigence on the part of the 
authoritarian government. This broader definition also captures individual as well as organized 
resistance, and allows for interruptions in the resistance due to repression. The social movement 
literature is practically silent on the issue of individual activism.5 For example, McCarthy and 
Zald (2009, pp 196-197) define a social movement as “a set of opinions and belief in a 
population which represents preference for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society.” But they identify organizations as the most likely manifestation 
of such opinions. The focus on organizations, while useful, misses important non-organizational 
contributions to the advancement of human rights and democracy, especially in countries with 
repressive regimes that make it harder to form peaceful resistance organizations that challenge 
the abusive power of a regime. By expanding the traditional definition of a social movement to 
include contributions from individual activists (including some who do not describe themselves 
as activists), one can detect a broader pattern of resistance. From the point of view of the target 
of resistance, a repressive regime, activism from individuals or organizations is all part of the 
resistance. Individual activists in this study include those from very weak, and usually very 
small, organizations that can offer little or no support for their activism. For example, a Liberian 
editor and his staff of a few reporters and a photographer, resisted efforts by the harsh regime of 
Samuel Doe to not publish critical articles and photos. Some individual attorneys in Kenya, 
though members of the Kenyan bar association, often had no support from the bar organization, 
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even opposition, in their legal actions against the government, including efforts to stop torture of 
detainees. 
Most studies of social movement focus on mass public demonstrations against 
repressive regimes, as in Eastern Europe (e.g., Karklins and Petersen 1993; Kuran 1991; 
Lohmann 1994); in the Soviet Union (Bessinger 2002); in Latin America (Eckstein 
2001); or in Iran (Kurzman 2005). Even the relatively few studies of social movements in 
sub-Sahara Africa focus, while providing excellent insights into non-violent resistance, 
focus mostly on large movements (e.g. Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher, 1999;  Tripp et al 2009). 
By themselves small, non-violent acts of resistance are not big enough to topple a regime; 
and they may not even be able to reform it. But small resistance movements can still 
perform critical human rights roles. They can document abuses through newspaper 
accounts, radio reports, and communications to international human rights organizations 
and diplomats. This in turn may draw international criticism of the regime and may result 
in international sanctions and other pressures against it, as happened in Liberia, where 
African regional and United Nations troops intervened and in Sierra Leone where 
regional and British troops stepped in. In contrast to the Arab uprisings of 2011, the 
resistance movements in Kenya and Liberia were initially small. But small-scale 
resistance movements have the advantage of being harder to detect and predict, especially 
when so loosely-connected as in the three countries studied here. There was no central 
leadership; participants came and went. They had no central offices; and in a pre-cell 
phone era, participants stayed in touch mostly by word-of-mouth in their capital cities. 
Small movements can also organize occasional mass public demonstrations as happened 
in all three countries.  
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While the social movement literature is generally rich in explanations of the various 
features normally associated with a movement, it is sparse in explaining how one actually starts. 
Building on this literature, and drawing from interviews and historical records, the current study 
offers insights on how resistance began in the three countries. 
This study also provides empirical evidence to indicate how activists often 
proceeded in the face of repression and in the absence of clear, external (exogenous) 
‘opportunities’ and without the kinds of materials resources often highlighted in studies 
of social movements. McCarthy and Zald (2009), closely associated with the social 
movement theory of “resource mobilization,” define such resources as primarily as 
“money and labor’ (195) as well as “legitimacy and facilities” (198). But in place of the 
usual material resources associated with movements in developed countries, ideas are 
seen in these cases as powerful motivators and resources. Max Weber hoped that his 
essay The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism might “in a modest way form 
contributions to the understanding of the manner in which ideas become effective forces 
in history” (Weber 1930 [1992]: 90-91). Historian/philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1991) has 
done a credible job of making this point in his writings, including The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas. Human rights advocate and former President 
of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel wrote (March 1, 1992, New York Times): “Communism 
was not defeated by military force, but by life, by the human spirit, by conscience, by the 
resistance of Being and man to manipulation.” Evan Zald, in an earlier work (1996, 261) 
made a similar point about “…the central importance of ideas and cultural elements in 
understanding the mobilization of participants in social movements…” 
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This study agrees with  Tarrow (2001, p 4-6) that the ‘cannon’ of social 
movement literature needs revision, especially regarding the concept of opportunity, a 
theory that generally has equated favorable external conditions known as opportunities 
with increased resistance, and vice versa.6 “The usual story of political opportunity goes 
basically in one direction – from opportunity to action,” as Goldstone and Tilly (2001, p 
180) note - citing McAdam (1996) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (1996). But, the two 
theorists add: “the reality is rather more complex (181), concluding: “An increase in 
repression or concessions is often followed by more protest, rather than less (193).” 
 Gamson and Meyer (who has given more attention to the theory of ‘opportunity’ 
than most scholars) argue the importance of structural opportunities but add that 
sometimes “movements can create opportunities” (1996, p 276). They add: “If  
movement activists interpret political space in ways that emphasize opportunity rather 
than constraint, they may stimulate actions that change opportunity, making their 
opportunity frame a self-fulfilling prophecy” (287). McAdam in 1996 (a book 
republished in 2006) noted that Gamson and Meyer’s argument “is not widely reflected 
in the extant literature… [which] is as puzzling as it is lamentable” (35-36). Gamson and 
Meyer caution that it remains an open question where the line can be drawn “between 
keeping hope alive under often discouraging circumstances and pursing some totally 
quixotic effort.”7 Compared to studies of social movements seeking policy changes in the 
democratic West, the current study of non-violent resistance in the three sub-Saharan 
countries adds important nuances to the theory of opportunity. It not only explores how 
activists proceeded in the absence of clearly-perceived exogenous ‘opportunities,’ but 
how they did so in the face of considerable danger.8  
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On a related theme, the current study disagrees with the heavy emphasis in the 
‘cannon’ of social movement theory on structure over agency or initiative. McAdam one 
of the main social movement theorists on structure (and how movements relate to the 
political process) notes that social movement scholars including Tarrow, Tilly, and 
himself, have been “strong proponents of the structural approach to the study of 
contention. Nor are we prepared to abandon this stance…” (McAdam 2001, p 227)   . 
Clearly structure is important in any political study and the current study recognizes this. 
But agency, or activism, was at the heart of the resistance in all three countries, as the 
empirical evidence below will show.  
 
Kenya 
 As will be argued below, domestic resistance played a critical factor in the decision in 1991 of 
President Daniel arap Moi to allow multi-party elections starting in 1992. Moi won that election, 
and the next one in 1997 against a divided opposition. When the opposition finally united in 
2002 and Moi was ineligible to run again, opposition leader (and former Vice President under 
Moi) Mwai Kibaki won. This section looks at the non-violent domestic resistance to the Moi 
regime from 1987-2002. 
From about 1987 overt resistance to the regime of Daniel arap Moi resurfaced after a 
period of covert opposition following a brutal crackdown on dissidents in the early and mid-
1980s. Few organizations felt safe enough to speak out except for some churches and, 
occasionally, depending on the current leadership, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and other 
legal professional groups. Ironically, individual activists often took the lead in resisting the 
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repressive regime. Some were members of organizations, but the organizations offered no 
support or even opposed their activism. A number of them had political ambitions and later ran 
successfully for Parliament or accepted positions in government. Much of the resistance also 
stemmed from professional commitments and was carried out with no central organization. 
Attorney Gibson Kamau Kuria, a member of LSK, is an example of someone who became 
a human rights activist in Kenya because of his job not because of joining a human rights 
organization. He did so as an individual. Though Kuria was a member of the LSK, it was under 
conservative leadership at the time and provided him no material or other support when in early 
1987 he agreed to represent two political detainees who alleged they had been tortured.9 Kuria 
sued the government to step the torture and was detained himself for nine months. His law 
partner Kiraitu Murungi then filled the same demand (he was not arrested).  
A number of other attorneys began resisting the regime during the period 1987-1991 by 
defending other political detainees, alleged enemies of the state, speaking out in public forums, 
publishing critical articles, insisting on the rule of law.10 They acted in their individual 
professional capacities. It was not until 1991 when Paul Muite became chair of the Law Society 
of Kenya that LSK began supporting such activism. Prior to that, human rights attorneys acted 
essentially as individuals. Even when they were associated with a small organization, like Gitobu 
Imanyara, editor of Nairobi Law Monthly, the organizations were not strong enough to offer 
much, if any, support for their resistance. Imanyara was “a glaring example of somebody who 
was acting as an individual.”11 Rev. Dr. Timothy Njoya also began speaking out publically 
against the regime in favor of democracy and human rights during this period. Although a 
member of the Presbyterian Church, his activism at this time was carried out both in his 
professional capacity – and essentially as an individual: the hierarchy of his church opposed his 
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activism and the church offered no support for it. These individual activists mostly knew each 
other and in a pre-cell phone era they managed to keep in touch. Some leading activists 
maintained a ‘war room,’ as one called it: a downtown attorney’s office where they had access to 
fax machines, telephones, and could meet to stay abreast of their activities – and safety.  
“Whenever one [of the activist attorneys] failed to come in the evening, frantic calls [were made] 
to find out [about them] because they could have been picked up [by police].12  
There was also some organizational resistance during this period. The Catholic Church, for 
example, as an institution, became more vocal in its defense of human rights. Along with Rev. 
Njoya, three other church leaders, who collectively became known as the clerical quartet, spoke 
out for greater human rights and democratization: Bishops Henry Okullu, David Gitari, and 
Alexander Muge of the Anglican Church of the Province of Kenya, and Njoya.13 Some human 
rights organizations, including the private Kenya Human Rights Commission led by attorney 
Willy Mutunga, and the International commission of Jurists (Kenya Section) were also active in 
reporting alleged abuses to the international press and diplomatic community. Dr. Wangari 
Maathai, head of the Greenbelt Movement, played a dual role as conservationist and political 
activist, challenging the regime on several issues and lending her support to an informal group of 
mothers of political prisoners. The mothers staged a dramatic and public protest, camping in a 
downtown park across from the very government building where political detainees had been 
tortured. Police soon broke up the protest with force, but the women moved to the nearby All 
Saints Cathedral where they were welcomed to stay – and did, for eleven months, by which time 
they had won the release of all but one of the prisoners.  
By 1990, informal resistance was growing from political opponents of the regime. Two 
Kikuyu political opposition figures, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, attempted to hold a 
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public rally promoting multi-party elections. The rally, scheduled for July 7, 1990,14 was quickly 
declared illegal by the regime, though large crowds showed up nevertheless. In 1991, another 
rally was planned for November 16. This one posed a greater threat to the regime because 
instead of being organized by Kikuyu alone, its seven organizers represented political opposition 
from a range of ethnic groups. They called themselves the Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy (FORD). The rally, known as the Kamakunji rally after the popular open venue for 
political meetings near downtown Nairobi, the capitol, was violently broken up by police and 
other security personnel.  
International pressure had been mounting in the early 1990s for Kenya and other sub-
Saharan, non-democratic countries to allow competitive elections. And in November 1991, a 
week after the violent suppression of the rally at Kamakunji, international donors froze aide to 
the regime, culminating growing impatience on the part of donors with Kenya’s economic 
performance. Shortly afterward, Moi agreed to allow multi-party elections. The timing of his 
decision, so close to the aid freeze, might lead one to conclude that donors forced him to make 
the reform. But this study argues that domestic unrest in Kenya from the late 1980s forward was 
the primary force behind the decision, something an independent study of donors also concluded 
(Brown 2000). Across the region, popular demands by Africans grew for greater human rights 
and democracy, spurred by the release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in 1990, the symbolic 
ending of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and poor economies across most 
of the sub-continent.  
After the 1992 multi-party election and Moi’s victory against a divided opposition, there 
was a proliferation of non-government organizations, including ones focusing on human rights. 
Resistance shifted from to primarily organizational and opposition party resistance. Despite 
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continuing selected repression of individual activists and key advocacy groups, organizational 
activists operated in a climate of expanding exercise of freedom of speech and assembly, with 
some opposition activists in Parliament, and with the growing popularity of opposition political 
rallies, despite regime attempts to block many of them. 
Taken in isolation, the individual and organizational activism might be described as 
unconnected instances of human rights and democratic resistance. But when viewed in a longer 
perspective, the resistance amounted to a social movement that grew into a culture of resistance, 
gradually involving a widening swath of the general public. The resistance came in three 
overlapping stages: the first stage (roughly 1987-1990/1991) involved notable instances of 
essentially individual activism carried out without obvious external ‘opportunities,’ in the face of 
government repression, without much international pressure for change and with little in the way 
of material resources. The second stage,  starting in about 1990 involved primarily organizational 
activism, gradually leading to a third stage which involved more mass participation at public 
rallies during the 1990s organized by opposition political parties, along with an increasingly 
critical media that highlighted human rights abuses.15 Critical journalistic reports had a double 
effect of making people more aware of their civil rights and of alerting international donors of 
abuses by the regime. A national network of human rights activists was developed with the help 
of Nairobi-based organizations.16 In 1997, in the lead up to the presidential elections that year, 
there were a series of public demonstrations calling for a new constitution with reduced 
presidential powers. Police shot and killed some demonstrators, yet the rallies continued. 
Between 1997 and the next election in 2002, when the opposition finally united to defeat the 
ruling party, most activism focused on constitutional forums and debates in an unsuccessful 
attempt to obtain a new constitution.  
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Kenya’s was not the more typical social/resistance movement with formal organization or 
offices and designated leaders; nor did it ever reach the mass mobilization of the resistance in 
Eastern Europe, or more recently in Egypt or Tunisia. It was a process of public challenges to a 
regime, using a variety of tactics and involving not only individual and organizational activism 
but at times mass public support. While international events and domestic conditions (namely a 
poor economy) and the repression itself provided a background to the resistance, these 
‘opportunities’ provided little safety for the participants in the resistance. The resistance was 
dangerous. Some leading activists were jailed and tortured; many participants at rallies were 
beaten; some were killed. Activists essentially created their own opportunities: their resistance 
became part of a growing, loosely-connected movement. 
 
Sierra Leone  
When Sierra Leone celebrated the 50th anniversary of independence from the British in 2011, it 
could also look back on nearly a decade of peace and democratic rule. Prior to that, however, the 
country saw two decades of rule by an autocrat, then rule by two military juntas and a ten-year 
civil war ending in 2002 that involved mass killing and amputations of civilians. Despite this 
repression, a non-violent resistance movement emerged at three distinct times pitting civilians 
against the autocratic President and then two military juntas. Most of the resistance took place in 
the capitol, Freetown, and involved students, journalists, attorneys, women’s groups, and others. 
The first campaign was started by a small group of university students but spread quickly to a 
nation-wide strike by university and high school students; the second involved an array of social 
organizations, most notably women’s organizations; the third involved mass civil disobedience, 
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encouraged by the main political opposition party. The resistance took place in the face of 
repression which at times was extreme. 
Up until 1977, President Stevens “had been able to silence all forms of resistance.”17 But 
in January 1977 at an outdoor graduation ceremony at the University of Sierra Leone’s Fourah 
Bay College, some students suddenly stood up as Stevens began addressing the crowd. They 
booed the President and held up placards calling for multi-party elections and an end to 
corruption.18  It was an unprecedented public display. “There was no opposition in Parliament; 
there were very few critical newspapers. So we [students at the College] formed ourselves into a 
sort of informal opposition,” recalled Olu Gordon, one of the student leaders there at the time.  
He [Stevens] was unable to go on. He was flabbergasted. I don’t think he had ever experienced 
anything like it before.”19 The students had no material resources other than placards; but they 
had the power of ideas, namely student dissatisfaction; and they had no external ‘opportunity,’ 
but proceeded despite the danger. 
Two days later, in a counter-demonstration which became known as All Thugs Day, the 
Youth League of Stevens’ ruling party, the All People’s Congress (APC), accompanied by the  
regime’s Internal Security Unit (ISU), stormed the mountain-top campus armed with knives and 
clubs. Some students and staff were assaulted and some property damaged. But by then 
secondary students in the thousands were beginning to join what became a nation-wide strike of 
both university and secondary school students.  Their slogan: “No College, No School” meant 
that if the President was going to close the College, they would not attend their secondary 
schools. Though the participation by secondary school students in the strike looked spontaneous, 
some university student leaders had been communicating with secondary student leaders 
concerning demands for human rights including freedom of expression.20 
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Stevens at first jailed some university student leaders including Hindolo Trye, President 
of the Student Union at Fourah Bay College. But as the nation-wide student strike continued, he 
released them and met with them to discuss holding a multi-party election to Parliament. 
Crowds, including young students, gathered around the President’s office daily during the 
negotiations. Finally Stevens agreed to a multi-party election, holding it quickly to catch the 
opposition, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) off guard. The election campaign was 
marked by much violence, as the President’s APC party organized thugs to intimidate candidates 
and voters in SLPP areas. Although 15 opposition candidates were elected, the APC quickly 
pushed through a bill that turned Sierra Leone back to a one-party state. All but one of the 
opposition candidates switched to the APC to avoid being expelled from Parliament. 
Thus this first round of resistance, led by students, floundered, in part due to the failure of 
the labor unions to join their strike. Critics of the labor movement claim labor leaders had been 
co-opted by Stevens, a charge one key labor leader refutes.21 The resistance bore the hallmarks 
of a traditional social movement, with grievances highlighted and framed by student leaders in a 
way that attracted more participants. The political ‘opportunity’ was not exogenous but 
endogenous, created by students who stood up and challenged an authoritarian leader to his face 
at a public event. Secondary school students had quickly joined in, though the labor movement 
did not. Though the resistance died out fairly quickly, students had broken the aura of 
invincibility of the President. This was a harbinger of human rights and democratic protests to 
come at two other critical junctures in the country’s path from despotism to democracy. 
In 1985, Stevens’ hand-picked successor, Major-General Joseph Momoh became 
President. He introduced multiparty rule, but he was unable to stop a civil war that broke out in 
1991 led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  In 1992, Momoh was ousted by a military 
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coup led by a group calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) which made 
Captain Valentine Strasser head of state. Though welcomed at first by many, the NPRC’s 
abusive life style and  failure to bring the war to a halt among charges of military corruption, 
sparked the second major social protest movement, led mostly by women. Women were active in 
politics in Sierra Leone back to the 1940s and 1950s. But they were pushed out in the 1970s by 
violence, re-emerging in the mid 1990’s as a social movement with a peace focus. “We had a 
crisis – a war: soldiers were out of control; rebels were advancing [on the capitol]. Peace was the 
rallying point. We had to move,” recalls Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff.”22  
As another of the women organizers, Amy Smythe, explained, the strategy for organizing 
included contacting women in religious groups, women lawyers, market women, even females 
working in the military, police and prisons to focus their attention on the war. They formed 
alliances among women’s groups and also worked with local diplomats. Tactics included 
marches, seminars, knocking on doors, press releases. And they worked directly with the NPRC. 
“These were young boys we had taught in school. We said: ‘We are your mothers.’ They listened 
to us and respected us,” Smythe added.23 The women successfully pushed their agenda at two 
national conferences in 1995 and 1996 with the demand to hold presidential elections promptly, 
and not wait until the war ended, which was the position of the NRPC. The NPRC under 
pressure from civil society and the international community reluctantly agreed to hold elections. 
In February 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was elected President.  
The third resistance movement, which involved widespread “unprecedented civil 
disobedience” (Alie 2006, p. 179), mostly in the capitol, began after elements of the military, led 
by Johnny Paul Koroma, deposed President Kabbah in May 1997. Calling themselves the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC),24 they quickly formed a government with the rebel 
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forces, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The alliance regime was “characterized by serious 
human rights violations and a complete breakdown of the rule of law.”25 Against this backdrop, 
the ousted elected government and much of the civilian population, angry at the disruption to the 
country’s new experiment in democracy, began a campaign of mostly non-violent civil 
disobedience and non-cooperation. There was loose, secret coordination. 
“The social fabric of society was torn. The civil disobedience was deliberate; 
planned. We had [clandestine] workshops, training people. If we had gone to the 
streets we could have been slaughtered.26  
The AFRC/RUF violently repressed any open dissent, including a demonstration 
organized in Freetown by the national Union of Sierra Leone August 18, 1997, “resulting in the 
death, injury and rape of many students” (Alie 2006, p. 186 fn. 37). The civil obedience took a 
number of forms. Trade organizations including the Sierra Leone Labour Congress and the Sierra 
Leone Teachers Union urged their workers to stay home; civil servants widely refused to 
perform more than minimal duties; many banks and shops were closed, though some remained 
open.  
“The country wasn’t running. Everything was shut down. There was no 
school at all. And a lot of people just emigrated; they left the country… There was 
a higher degree of coordination than I’d ever seen between the various groups [in 
civil society, including political opposition parties] – because there was one 
enemy  27 
Members of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists [SLAJ] refused a junta order to 
register their newspapers with the regime. In response “the junta went on a rampage and arrested 
any known journalist” they could locate. One journalist, Paul Mansaray “was killed in a 
church.”28  Some others, including Kelvin Lewis were rounded up and held temporarily in 
shipping containers.29  In spite of the great risk, about half a dozen newspapers critical of the 
regime continued publishing with skeletal crews and from clandestine locations. One of those 
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journalists working underground was Olu Gordon. “When I look back at some of the things I’ve 
done… [laughs heartily] I wouldn’t do them now. At the time we just took chances. We did what 
had to be done.”  His remark illustrated the sense of professional duty some journalists, attorneys 
and other felt that led them to be a part of the resistance, not through a human rights organization 
but as part of their own professional work. 
While some of the non-cooperation with the junta reflected intentional civil disobedience, 
some of it was due to fear of going outdoors on streets due to frequent violence by the junta. Still 
others resisted with clear political goals. Julius Spencer, for example, SLPP Minister of 
Information from 1998-2001, operated with two others the clandestine Radio Democracy to 
“counter propaganda from the junta [and] to destabilize the junta” using informants’ information 
on junta plans and counter-propaganda, some of which was “not accurate.”30  Radio Democracy 
gave people “that ray of hope that all is not lost yet,” said journalist Lewis.31 
Amidst strong international condemnation and military intervention, spurred by the 
domestic reporting and widespread civil opposition, the junta was driven out of Freetown in 
February 1998 by Nigerian troops and again in January 1999 after rebel forces returned to the 
city and engaged in a month-long orgy of violence. The war officially ended in January 2002, 
after United Nations and British troops joined the fight against the rebels. The resistance by 
civilians in Sierra Leone had taken various forms, carried out despite clear external  
‘opportunities’ and often in the face of extreme risks and danger. Sometimes the resistance 
involved mass demonstrations, sometimes more individual acts as professionals doing their jobs, 
sometimes quiet civil disobedience. With minimal material resources those organizing resistance 
relied on the intertwined ideas of human rights, democracy, and peace for motivation. 
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Liberia 
  When Samuel Doe took power in 1980 in a military coup, he became the first head of state 
from an indigenous background. But he dashed hopes for a more inclusive politics with his 
reliance on members of his own ethnic group, the Krahn. His regime was marked by extreme 
repression against his perceived enemies; the violence, especially after an attempted coup, was 
horrific at times (Berkeley 1986). A civil war broke out in late December 1989 by the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. In 1990, Doe was executed by a splinter 
group of the NPFL. Despite intervention by West African peace keeping troops, several peace 
agreements were broken and the war continued until Taylor was elected President in 1997, 
instigating a repressive regime that showed little tolerance for persistent critics of his actions 
(Human Rights Watch 1998). In 2003, Taylor went into exile in Nigeria with rebels approaching 
the capital, Monrovia, and under an international indictment. He was later convicted by a special 
UN-backed court for crimes involving his own rebel activities in fomenting a civil war in 
neighboring Sierra Leone to gain resources for the war in Liberia. After an interim government, 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected President in 2005, taking office in January 2006 as Africa’s 
first female elected head of state. She was reelected in 2012. 
Against the repressive regimes of Doe and Taylor, Liberians carried out non-violent 
resistance at various times which involved individual and organizational activists, generally 
without the kind of exogenous ‘opportunities’ one notes in much of the social movement 
literature as important to resistance. Liberians mounted small, decentralized campaigns of 
resistance with highly-motivated participants, involving skillful use of the media and relations 
with international organizations. They built this on an earlier record of resistance.32 There were 
some mass demonstrations, but not many: it was often too dangerous. Most of the resistance took 
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such forms as court challenges, journalistic reporting and commentary, church documentation of 
abuses. It involved at times individual activists organizing particular protest events, as well as 
spontaneous public show of support for arrested activists. Women organized to protest the war, 
starting with a few, including Mary Brownell, and Etweda Cooper, and later involving mass 
demonstrations of Christian and Moslem women. In one of the poorest countries in Africa and 
with few material resources, they proceeded in the face of extreme danger. Activists had two 
audiences: domestic and international. Much of the effort of activists was aimed at documenting 
abuses and passing that information to international, non-government organizations such as 
Amnesty International, and to diplomatic representatives, especially from the United States. The 
resistance amounted to social movements. They operated on a small scale and took place almost 
entirely in the capital, Monrovia, where most of the activists lived and worked.  
Under Doe, some of the resistance came from journalists doing their job and continuing 
critical reporting despite government threats.33 Kenneth Best, editor of an independent 
newspaper who eventually fled the country, was one of those who published critical articles 
about Doe. He is another example of activism stemming from commitment to a profession not 
membership in a human rights organization. 
“A few of us, a few of the papers, had to do what we had to do – cover the 
wrongs of society, cover the news, good or bad. And that’s why we were 
constantly at loggerheads with the government. My paper was closed down five 
times under Doe. I went to jail three times. My wife and my secretary and female 
reporter and female advertising lady went to jail for four days. We had three arson 
attacks [which he suspects were by government agents].”34 
During the civil war, the city was usually cut off from most of the rest of the country by 
fighting. But despite the outward peace in Monrovia, Doe (and later Taylor) used violence there 
against those who challenged their authority. Individual attorneys were among the activists, but 
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the main lawyers association was not politically active during most of the study period, leaving it 
up to members whether to pursue human rights issues as individual attorneys. Some did, filing 
suits seeking the release of fellow activists, demanding respect of the right of habeas corpus, and 
arguing in court for democratic freedoms. When they could, attorneys acted collectively based 
on collegial relations, not professional organization.  
The Press Union leadership, on the other hand, was active on behalf of the many 
reporters and editors who continued to write articles critical of the government despite threats 
from the state to desist.  The Catholic Church was also very active in the resistance including, 
most notably, Archbishop Michael Kapakala Francis, who bravely denounced violence under 
Doe and Taylor. He and some other clergy members were drawn into the resistance, not because 
they wanted to be activists but because their sense of moral duty required them not to remain 
silent in the face of repression.  Students also played an important role in the early resistance to 
the Doe regime: 
“Students have been the voice, the conscience of society since the ‘70s. But this is 
due largely to the fact that political institutions in the country have been generally 
weak and effectively succeeding in creating a vacuum into which students stepped 
unwillingly – I would say.”35 
 
For most students in a poor country like Liberia, ideas and their own numbers were 
practically the only ‘resource’ they have in a resistance movement. In Liberia, as in Sierra Leone, 
they were the ‘foot soldiers’ of the resistance, helping provide mass support as they did in the 
1979 protests in Liberia against a proposed government hike in the price of rice under President 
Tolbert. In 1980, shortly after the coup that brought Doe to power, students again provided the 
mass support for an early demand on the new President to not abuse the rights of the people and, 
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in fact, to take the military back to the barracks. Students massed with other Liberians in a march 
on Doe’s Executive Mansion in 1990 to ask him to demand he step down in the name of peace as 
rebels were closing in on the city. As one Liberian former student activist leader described it, the 
students became the “shock force of the intelligentsia.” 
“Student leaders were raising questions, working with 
workers…professors, who wanted to be seen as dealing with these issues rather 
than sitting on the sidelines. Their grievances were about imbalance in education, 
lack of balance in development, concentration of wealth in the hands of a few; 
and Monrovia being the only place that had anything else. The rest of the country 
was left in ruins…The coup [by Doe in 1980] was taking advantage of the 
grievances.”36  
 
In resistance campaigns that lack many of the material resources one would normally 
associate with a social movement, the issue of motives is all the more important. Based on 
extensive, in-depth interviews with many of the key activists, the themes of principle and 
ambition emerge and sometimes merged in all three countries. “People were not moving all the 
time with mass action, expecting bullets to hit their breast; but in various ways there was 
resistance every step of the way,” said Amos Sawyer, one of those advocating for democratic 
reforms during this dangerous period.37 Sawyer ran for Mayor of Monrovia during Doe’s regime 
(the election was cancelled) and later became one of the interim Presidents of Liberia between 
the Doe and Taylor incumbencies. He and several other political figures, including Conmany 
Wesseh, had been active in the 1970s pushing for more democratic participation, providing 
important precedents or models for later resistance as well as mentorships for younger activists.38  
The advocates/activists in Liberia, regardless of their motives for engagement, faced risks 
of reprisals from the Doe and Taylor regimes. Sawyer and Wesseh, for example, were victims of 
a physical attack under the Taylor regime, apparently for their outspoken advocacy of democracy 
and development and for jointly producing public reports that contradicted claims by President 
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Taylor.  Frances Johnson-Morris, an attorney who later became a Cabinet Minister in the 
Administration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, may have had political ambitions for some years, but 
her earlier activism exposed her to risk of government reprisals.  
 “We helped to free journalists that had been detained for reporting certain 
stories – by the government. We went to the aid of those who were brutalized. In 
some instances we assisted some of them to go to hospitals to treat their wounds. 
And we sought the release of political detainees and prisoners.” 39  
Journalist Gabriel Williams, a leader in the Press Union of Liberia in the 1980s, like 
many journalists, was threatened by the Doe regime for his efforts to be impartial.  
“We had to advocate for freedom of speech and the press and respect for 
the rule of law. There’s no such thing as ‘you are a hero’. No. We were just 
ordinary guys doing what we had to do, and all of a sudden you face death. I was 
so scared.” 40 
 This sense of “doing what we had to do” is a theme that runs through interviews with 
many of the journalists, lawyers, and others who challenged the regimes in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Kenya. They saw their resistance as simply as part of what they considered their professional 
responsibilities. Hassan Bility was a Liberian journalist whose articles exposing human rights 
abuses by the Taylor regime resulted in his arrest seven times. On one occasion he was confined 
for approximately two weeks in an underground cell partially filled with water, hauled out 
regularly for further torture by electric shocks. Ironically he was offered, and refused, a job 
working for Taylor in public relations because his articles were so popular. Bility and some other 
activists were motivated by “self-interest,” but the term needs “clarification,” he said. 
Activists felt they could “bring about a change that would create an 
enabling environment for them and their family...improve their life style…The 
reason I was in this was to see Liberia [be] better. There were many people who 
didn’t have food. I wanted people to have food and move freely. Seeing people 
happy was the motivation.” 41 
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Conclusion 
This study of non-violent resistance in Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Liberia against 
repressive regimes helps provide several insights on human rights social movements. (1) 
Individual activism, as well as organizational activism, can play an important part in a 
resistance movement. In Kenya, especially, and to a lesser extent in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, resistance involved individual activism, often by professional lawyers, 
journalists, and others drawn into it by way of their profession and not through 
participation in human rights organizations. This study included in the category of 
‘individual’ activists those in organizations too small to offer any support for their 
activism, or those in organizations that opposed their activism. By expanding the 
definition of social movements to include such individuals, whether motivated by a sense 
of commitment to their profession, or in some cases political ambition, one detects a 
wider range of activists than most studies highlight. (2) Small movements can play an 
important role in pressuring repressive regimes. These were not the mass-movements of 
the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, though at times there were some mass demonstrations in all 
three countries. But small movements can, and in these cases did, help bring international 
attention to human rights abuses. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the movements also helped 
justify international intervention that allowed democratic governments to operate. (3) 
Though social movement literature generally focuses on the building blocks of a 
movement, this study adds insight on how movements actually start, sometimes with a 
few students, journalists, or mothers whose activism draws wider support. (4) Contrary to 
the more traditional focus in social movement studies on structure, the empirical 
evidence, which includes structural elements, strongly supports the importance of an 
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agency focus. Finally, in contrast to studies of social movements aimed at winning policy 
reforms in the democratic West which often emphasize the need for exogenous 
‘opportunities’ and material resources, this study of activists seeking not regime reform 
but regime change, shows how non-violent resistance can proceed despite the lack of 
such ‘opportunities’ and despite significant material resources, even in the face of 
considerable danger. 
(insert Table 1 here) 
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Table 1 
State Repression in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia: 1981-2003 
(Lower scores = more repression/less respect for human rights) 
YEAR Kenya 
Sierra 
Leone   Liberia 
1981 6 8 5 
1982 6 6 5 
1983 6 6 6 
1984 6 6 5 
1985 5 7 2 
1986 6 7 5 
1987 5 6 5 
1988 3 6 4 
1989 4 6 3 
1990 5 5  Chaos 0 
1991 3 3  Chaos 0 
1992 2 0  Chaos 0 
1993 5 1  Chaos 0 
1994 4 0  Chaos 0 
1995 4 0  Chaos 0 
1996 4 3 0 
1997 4 Chaos 0 2 
1998 2 Chaos 0 0 
1999 1 Chaos 0 1 
2000 2 Chaos 0 0 
2001 3 4 1 
2002 2 8 1 
2003 3 5 1 
Total 91 87 46 
Source: Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Set. www.humanrightsdata.org  which 
began in 1981. Physical Integrity includes torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, 
and disappearance. “It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full 
government respect for these four rights.”  The data is based primarily on analyses of the United 
States Department of State annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and on Amnesty 
International’s annual reports. “If there are discrepancies between the two sources, coders are 
instructed to treat the Amnesty International evaluation as authoritative…to remove a potential 
bias in favor of U.S. allies.” (CIRI 2008).   
Notes: chaos: civil war; no data available; coded in this article as 0, indicating no government 
respect for human rights given the atrocities that occurred. Most non-violent resistance took 
place in the capitols, outside the war zones, though at times in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the 
conflict swept into the capitols. 
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Notes 
1 A study covering 67 countries and their transitions from 1972 to 2005 found that there was 
“more than a three (66 percent) to one chance” of a country achieving transition to “a high level 
of democratic political practices and effective adherence to fundamental civil liberties” where the 
civic opposition is nonviolent or mostly nonviolent (Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005, pp 5 and 
8). 
2 This method involves prepared questions but allows flexibility to follow up on unexpected 
responses. 
3 These reports were later supplemented by more detailed comparisons of repression using The 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Set is updated regularly and covers most of the 
study period for the three countries. See Table 1. 
4  In contrast to other regions of the world, there have been relatively few studies on Africa using 
social movement theories to help analyze political resistance campaigns. The few there are 
typically focus on large movements (e.g. Ellis and van Kessel 2009; Tripp et al. 2009). The 
current study includes phases of human rights activism which were relatively small at times.) 
5 An exception to this is a brief mention by DeLeat (2006, p 59-60): “In reality, nation-states are 
not the vanguard of the human rights movement…nongovernmental organizations and 
individuals are at the forefront of the struggle for universal human rights” (emphasis added).  
6 Tarrow (2001, p. 6) suggests the term “contentious politics’ might help move the debate on 
social movement theories forward. 
7 Meyer focuses primarily on social movements aimed at policy changes in the democratic West. 
The current study focuses on movements in countries with repressive governments where 
activists aimed at regime change, not policy reforms. 
8 The three-country study argues that activists often created their own opportunities; but at other 
times the concept of ‘opportunity’ was supplanted by other explanations.  
9 An Amnesty International report (1987), Kenya: Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials, 
documents such torture. 
10 Among other activist attorneys at the time was Gitobu Imanyara, who also wrote articles 
critical of the regime; Paul Muite, John Khaminwa, James Orengo, and Pheroze Nowrojee. 
11 Willy Mutunga, then head of the independent Kenya Human Rights Commission, in an 
interview with the author, September 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2011 he was named Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Kenya. 
12 Martha Karua, attorney, in an interview with the author August 15, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya.  
13 The Catholic church and the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK) spoke out strongly 
against the violence of ethnic clashes in 1991 and 1992 which many blamed on government 
attempts to chase Kikuyu voters out of the Rift Valley to gain electoral advantage for the ruling 
party. 
14 The rally was known as Saba Saba, Swahili for Seven Seven after its date the seventh day of 
the seventh month, July. 
15 Gamson and Meyer ([1996] 2006, pp 287-290) recognize use of the media as an “opportunity” 
for activists, though noting it can be used by a regime as well. In all three countries in the current 
study activists made use of the media to help promote their cause. 
16 Ruteere, Mutuma of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, in an interview, August 21, 2002 
with the author in Nairobi, Kenya. 
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17 Alie, Joe A.D., Chairman of the Department of History and Africa Studies, Fourah Bay 
College, in an interview with the author May 5, 2009 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
18 Historian Alie writes ( 2006, p 85)  that students had become “very radical and anti-system” 
due to a combination of  “[p]oor educational facilities, inadequate and inappropriate curricula, 
programmes, and  lack of employment opportunities…” 
19 Gordon, Olu, one of the student leaders at the time, in an interview with the author Nov. 28, 
2008, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Another student leader at the time, Hindolo Trye, gave a 
similar account, also confirmed by Liberian historian Joe A.D. Alie.. 
20 Trye, Hindolo, President of the campus Student Union at the time, in an interview with the 
author, December 12, 2008, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
21 Tejan Kassim, labor leader then and still at the time of an interview with the author, April 20, 
2009, argued that communications between labor and students “broke down,” in part due to a 
split in student support for the strike based on ethnic lines. He also noted absence of a labor 
strike fund at the time. 
22 Jusu-Sheriff, Yasmin, Deputy Chair of the Human Rights Council of Sierra Leone, a 
government entity, and a leader of the women’s movement for peace in the mid 1990s, in an 
interview with the author,  February 2, 2011 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
23 Smythe, Amy, in an interview with the author, January 31, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
24 Opponents of the AFRC called it “APC #2,” referring to the All People’s Congress party of 
Siaka Stevens because they “brought back some cronies” of that party, as Ambrose James, a 
former student activist in the 1990s, said in an interview with the author, February 13, 2009 in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
25 Human Rights Watch, July 1998. 
26 Bangura, Zaineb, one of the key activists at this time, who later became Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, in an interview with the author, May 5, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
27 Gordon, Olu interview. 
28 Bah, Ibrahim El-Tayib, Vice President of SLAJ at the time, in an interview with the author, 
January 19, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
29 Lewis, Kelvin, in an interview with the author, February 13, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
30 Spencer, Julius, in an interview with the author June 18, 2009, in Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Numerous additional interviewees commented that Radio Democracy boosted public morale 
against the AFRC/RUF junta. 
31 Kelvin Lewis interview. 
32 Resistance in Liberia to repression dates back into the 19th century. And for several decades in 
the 20th century, pamphleteer Albert Porte bravely challenged various regimes to respect freedom 
of expression and other rights. Among those pushing for political rights in the 1970s  was a small 
group of academics, including Amos Sawyer, G. Baccus Matthews, H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr., 
and Togba-Na-Tipoteh. 
33 As in Sierra Leone, many of the journalists operated essentially as individual activists; their 
‘organization’ often consisted of little more than a few reporters working out of tiny offices. 
34 Best, Kenneth, in an interview with the author, June 17, 2006,  in Monrovia, Liberia. 
35 Stewart, John, in an interview with the author, July 14, 2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
36 Wesseh, Conmany, in an interview with the author, June 24, 2006,  in Monrovia, Liberia. 
37 Sawyer, Amos, in an interview with the author, June 26, 2006 in Monrovia, Liberia. 
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38 In the 1970s, the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), led by Togba-Na-Tipoteh, Amos 
Sawyer, and H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr., and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by G. 
Baccus Matthews, provided early models of resistance to future activists. 
39 Johnson-Morris, Frances, in an interview with the author, June 21,  2006  in Monrovia, 
Liberia. 
40 Williams, Gabriel, in an interview with the author, June 10,  2006, in Monrovia, Liberia. 
41 Bility, Hassan, in a telephone interview with the author, March 2, 2008, in the United States. 
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